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Abstract:
Frontiers provide an opportunity for one jurisdiction to remedy inequities
(and even exploit them) in highway finance by employing toll-booths, and
thereby ensuring the highest possible share of revenue from non-residents.
If one jurisdiction sets policy in a vacuum, it is clearly advantageous to
impose as high a toll on non-residents as can be supported.  However, the
neighboring jurisdiction can set policy in response.  This establishes the
potential for a classical prisoner’s dilemma consideration: in this case to tax
(cooperate) or to toll (defect).  Even if both jurisdictions would together
raise as much revenue from taxes as from tolls (and perhaps more since
taxes may have lower collection costs), the equilibrium solution in game
theory, under a one-shot game, is for both parties to toll.  However in the
case of a repeated game, cooperation (taxes and possibly revenue sharing)
which has lower collection costs is stable.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Tolls are viewed by transport economists as a more efficient means for financing
highways and allocating scarce road space than general taxes in many cases (Bernstein and
Muller 1983; de Palma and Lindsey 1998; Downs 1994; Dupuit 1849; Gittings 1987;
Keeler and Small 1977; Mohring 1970; Poole 1994; Roth 1996; Small 1983; Small,
Winston, and Evans 1989; TRB 1994; Verhoef, Nijkamp, and Rietveld 1996; Vickery
1963, 1969; Viton 1981, 1995).  During some periods in the history of road financing,
tolls have been widely used, including in the United States during the period from the late
1700s through the mid 1800s (Klein 1990), and again from 1940 - 1956 (Gomez-Ibañez
and Meyer 1993).  However most roads are now financed with gas taxes or from general
revenue.  If tolls ever again become a widely used revenue source, it won’t happen
overnight, they will be staged into wide acceptance.  Some locations will be more
politically acceptable for new toll collections than others.  In particular, jurisdiction
boundaries or frontiers, where at least half the crossing vehicles are driven by non-
residents, would seem to be among the most politically palatable.  However a frontier, by
definition, involves more than one jurisdiction, and the policies of neighbors affect each
other.
i
This paper considers the welfare implications of tolling at a frontier under
alternative behavioral assumptions: different objectives (welfare maximizing, profit
maximizing, cost recovery), willingness to cooperate on setting tolls, and over different
time frames (one-time interactions and repeated interactions).  By understanding how tolls,
welfare, and profits vary under different behavioral assumptions, we can better understand
the motivations of jurisdictions and under which behaviors tolls will be most likely.
There are two problems that are considered in this paper, referred to as strategic and
tactical decisions respectively.   First is the strategic decision: will a jurisdiction tax or toll?
Second is the tactical decision: if it tolls, what toll will it set? The decision to toll and the
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rate of toll set by one jurisdiction affects the welfare of the residents of another jurisdiction,
leading to interactions and possible gains to both jurisdictions by cooperating. Game
Theory, developed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern  (1944), presents an analytic
approach to explain the choices of multiple actors in conflict with each other with scope for
cooperation, where the payoffs are interdependent (Axelrod 1984, Hargreaves-Heap and
Varoufakis 1995, Osborne and Rubinstein 1994, Rapoport 1970, Taylor 1987).
The focus of this paper is on the revenue policies and rates of toll which emerge at
jurisdiction boundaries under alternative behaviors in the absence of congestion. The model
is developed in Section 2.  Alternative objectives, one aspect of behavioral variation is
considered in Section 3.  Two different toll-setting methods, cooperative and non-
cooperative are investigated in Section 4, and comprise the second main behavioral
variation.  Section 5 provides algebraic solution to the model under the different behaviors.
Section 6 presents empirical values for the model, so that sensitivity tests may be conducted
in Section 7 and the model applied in Section 8 in the context of a one-shot game.  Section
9 extends the analysis of Section 8 into the realm of repeated games, where many outcomes
are possible.  Section 10 makes some concluding remarks.
2. MODEL
We assume an infinitely long two way road covered by two jurisdictions, one
ranging from the point -¥ to a boundary point b  (jurisdiction JI), the other covering the
area from point b  to +¥ (jurisdiction JJ). Both jurisdictions may establish toll-booths at the
boundary.  Tolls can be collected in either one or both directions,  which will affect welfare
by a fixed amount associated establishing toll-booths and a variable cost per collection.  For
convenience we assume tolls in both directions if tolls are collected.  There are no internal
toll-booths. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
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This network structure implies four classes of trips, trips staying within JI (Tii),
trips from JI to JJ (Tij), trips from JJ to JI (Tji) and trips staying within JJ (Tjj).  We are only
concerned with trips crossing the boundary.  By assuming symmetry, the equations for Tij
and Tji trips are identical.
Our model assumes that flow ( fb ) across point b on a road is described by a
negative exponential model, where demand depends on the toll charged by both
jurisdictions can be described by the function below.
fb = we
a rI +rJ ( ) (1)
where:  fb = flow past point b
w, a = model parameters
rI, rJ = the toll charged by jurisdiction JI , JJ
Because the jurisdictions are infinite in size, we are not interested in total welfare,
rather only in welfare crossing the boundary point b.  The consumer’s surplus of local
boundary crossing trips (Uij) is measured as the difference between what each consumer
would pay and what they do pay.  We can solve for consumers’ surplus by integrating the
demand function over the range of tolls from what they do pay (rI + rJ) to infinity.  This is
given by equation (2).
ii
Uij = we





a rI +rJ ( )
a
(2)
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Two components comprise cost: network use cost (CNij) and toll collection cost
(CVij). External costs are excluded because jurisdictions don’t generally include them in
their decision making.  Implicit in this model is that jurisdictions have the obligation of
maintaining a level of service with a specific travel speed.  Thus “congestion effects” are
ascribed to infrastructure costs which are proportional to traffic flow.  To simplify the
analysis we assume no (dis)economies of scale and we assume smoothly and continuously
increasing infrastructure costs.  We assume zero fixed costs associated with operating the
network or collecting tolls or taxes.  Equation 3 shows the network use cost  (CNij), which
equals the flow multiplied by the average trip length of the portion of the trip in jurisdiction





a rI +rJ ( ) (3)
Equation 4 provides the cost of toll collection per traveler  (CVij) as the flow multiplied by
the collection cost per crossing (q).  
CVij = qwe
a rI +rJ ( ) (4)
Equation 5 shows the revenue from toll collection (Rij) as the rate of toll for jurisdiction I
(rI) multiplied by flow.
Rij = rIwe
a rI+rJ ( ) (5)
3. OBJECTIVES
Which objective jurisdictions employ will shape the resulting tolls and welfare, and
thus perhaps the decision to employ tolls. When it is assumed that jurisdictions have the
objective of local welfare maximization, welfare is defined narrowly as the sum of profit
(loss) from administering the road and consumers’ surplus for its residents, as shown in
equation (6).
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WL = Uij +2 * Rij -2 *CNij - 2* CVij (6)
The profit maximization objective excludes all consumers’ surplus as given in
equation (7)  This represents conditions when the toll-booth is privately controlled, for
instance to compare the consequences of unfettered private control with the public control
of the network.  To the extent that the welfare losses associated with private control are not
excessive, it may be a reasonable organizational form for jurisdictions to consider.
Max
rI
P = 2 * Rij -2 *CNij - 2* CVij (7)
We can analyze the objective of  local welfare maximization with a cost-recovery
constraint.  This objective requires that tolls be high enough to recover the costs imposed




s.t. 0 = 2* R ij - 2 *CNij - 2* CVij
(8)
Finally, we might for comparison purposes identify what would happen if both
jurisdictions (JI and JJ) were under single control.  If that government imposes tolls, it will
only require a single toll-booth, so collection costs will remain the same as a single
jurisdiction.  On the other hand, it will consider consumer’s surplus of all frontier crossing
trips and the network costs they impose on both jurisdictions roads.
Max
r I
WG = 2* U ij + 4 * R ij - 4 * CNij - 2* CVij (9)
4. TOLL-SETTING
The discussion to date still leaves some latitude in how to solve the tactical problem
of toll-setting.   The issue, in solving for the toll of jurisdiction I (rI) , is what toll (rJ) does
jurisdiction I assume that jurisdiction J uses when it is known what policy they choose.
Two approaches can be considered: non-cooperative and cooperative equilibria.
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First, if we assume no collusion (implicit or otherwise), we attain a non-cooperative
Nash equilibrium for toll-setting.  This means that Jurisdiction I can do no better by
changing its toll given what Jurisdiction J does, while Jurisdiction J can also do no better.
This does not necessarily result in the best satisfaction of the objective function, but is
sustainable.  This is solved keeping the two toll variables: rI and rJ , separate and not
necessarily equal.
It may be possible to attain higher overall welfare (profit) than non-cooperative
approach.  However it will be to the advantage of any jurisdiction to cheat (i.e. raise tolls)
if the other jurisdiction doesn’t cheat or retaliate but retains the cooperative tolls resulting
from this solution. The cooperative solution is sustainable as an equilibrium in indefinitely
repeated games.
iii Simply, the issue again is how does Jurisdiction I treat rJ. To attain this
cooperative solution, each jurisdiction includes both its own and the other jurisdiction’s
tolls as variables in its objective satisfaction calculations. (Under non-cooperative
equilibrium, the other jurisdiction’s toll could be treated as a constant).  The overall payoff
maximizing result can be achieved by setting rJ = rI in the equations, and solving for the
equilibrium toll ( r*=rJ=rI).
Economic theory argues that, when jurisdictions are welfare maximizing,
cooperation should result in the rate of toll equal to the marginal cost of travel for those
paying the toll, that is the network cost which is the average trip length of the portion of the
trip in Jurisdiction I (1/y) multiplied by a cost per unit distance (f) plus the cost of toll
collection (q).  In fact, this is the case as will be seen in the next section.
iv  In the absence
of fixed costs, and where average costs equal marginal costs, this implies cost recovery is
satisfied.
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5. SOLUTIONS
Table 1 shows algebraic solutions for each scenario (combining objective and toll-
setting methodology) assuming that jurisdictions do employ tolls.  These results were
simplified by assuming the demand coefficient a=-1.  The final column shows the
mathematical result assuming the empirical values described in the next section.
Table 1: Tolls by Scenario
Scenario (Objective: Maximize; Toll-Setting) Solution Result






























note: solution obtained by setting a = -1, result obtained with empirical values described in Table 2.
* indicates tolls in case of Global Welfare Maximization, which should be halved to compare with other
scenarios.
The first thing to note is that the tolls resulting from the non-cooperative welfare
maximizing scenario (rI
WN ) are the same as cooperative profit maximizing tolls (rI
ÕC ). As
mentioned in the previous section, we find that welfare maximizing cooperative tolls (rI
WC)
do equal the marginal costs of travel across the frontier.   Also, because we have no fixed
costs here, the tolls and welfare from the cost recovery objective is the same as welfare
Published as: Levinson, David (1999) Tolling at a Frontier: A Game Theoretic Analysis. 
Proceedings of the 14th International Symposium on Transportation and Traffic Theory 173-187.Tolling at a Frontier
9
maximizing with cooperative toll-setting.  The global welfare maximizing objective also has
tolls equal to marginal costs, just that with fewer toll-booths, marginal costs are lower.
We realize some other interesting relationships in the analysis, independent of the
empirical values of the model coefficients:
1.  Profit maximizing cooperative tolls  (rI
ÕC ) are always $0.50 higher than welfare
maximizing cooperative tolls (rI
WC ).
2.  Profit maximizing non-cooperative tolls (rI
ÕN ) are always $0.50 higher than welfare
maximizing non-cooperative tolls (rI
WN ).
3.  Welfare maximizing non-cooperative tolls (rI
WN ) are always $0.50 higher than
cooperative tolls (rI
WC ),
4.  Profit maximizing non-cooperative tolls (rI
ÕN ) are always $0.50 higher than
cooperative tolls (rI
ÕC ).
5.  Therefore, profit maximizing non-cooperative tolls (rI
ÕN ) are always $1.00 higher than
welfare maximizing cooperative tolls (rI
WC ).
These relationships are summarized in Equation (10);
rI
WC +$1.00 = r I
WN +$0.50 = rI
PC +$0.50 = rI
PN (10)
In contrast with the usual application of cooperative equilibria for analyzing
industrial organization of competitive markets, the best repeated game (cooperative)
equilibrium toll is lower than the Nash equilibrium (non-cooperative) toll.   Furthermore,
the lower toll results in higher welfare and profit.  The main reason for this is that we are
dealing with complementary rather than substitute goods in our revenue mechanism game.
Thus, cooperation to lower tolls allows higher welfare in an application similar to serial
monopolists raising profits by cooperating to lower tolls  (Chamberlin 1933).  A second
reason is that the objective function includes not just profit, but also consumers’ surplus.
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6. EMPIRICAL VALUES
The model does not have much real-world meaning without understanding typical
values for the model coefficients.  Table 2 gives some values developed from earlier
research by the author (Levinson 1998).  The first two variables, a and w describe
demand.   The variable a is set to -1, this value makes consistent what is known about the
user costs of highway travel developed from a full cost study (Levinson and Gillen 1998)
and a gravity model’s decay function (Levinson and Kumar 1995).  This variable must be
less than zero to ensure that demand falls when prices rise.  The second demand variable w
describes the number of trips when the total monetary price rI + rJ = 0.  Clearly this is a
scalar and does not affect tolls or the ultimate decision to tax or toll in this analysis. To keep
this analysis consistent with other research by the author, it is set at 2338, which is a value
derived from a more complex version of the model (considering multiple jurisdictions). The
variable network cost is the cost that a jurisdiction faces for every vehicle kilometer
traveled.  The value of f=0.018 was estimated by Levinson and Gillen (1998) from a
database of state highway expenditures and vehicle travel.  The variable collection cost (q)
was estimated from toll collection costs on California bridges (Levinson 1998).  Average
trip length (1/y) within the jurisdiction was calculated from the multiple jurisdiction model,
which required a factor for which trips were sensitive to distance traveled, (y=$0.15/km),
developed in Levinson and Gillen (1998).
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Table 2 : Empirical Values of Model Coefficients
Variable Description Value
alpha (a) coefficient relating demand to price -1
omega (w) demand multiplier (trips at price =0) 2338
phi (f) variable network cost  ($/vkt) 0.018
1/psi (1/y) average trip length in jurisdiction
(km)
6.67
theta (q) variable collection cost ($/vehicle) 0.08
7. SENSITIVITY TESTS
Figures 2 through 5 show sensitivity of the model as we vary key parameters
around their assumed variable (shown in Table 2).  Table 3 gives us the elasticity (the
percentage change of the variable of interest: tolls, profits, and welfare for each percentage
change in the input variable for each scenario.  Figures 2, 3, and 4 illustrate how tolls rise
linearly as unit costs  (q, f) and trip lengths (1/y) rise, keeping all other variables at the
values shown in Table 2.  Figure 5 shows how welfare and profits change as tolls (rI=rJ)
vary, again assuming all other variables are at the values shown in Table 2.  Welfare is
maximized when tolls are $0.20, profits when tolls are $0.70.  Clearly when collection and
network unit costs rise, welfare and profits decline.  Trip lengths are somewhat more
complicated, as they rise, tolls rise but so does welfare and profit until trip lengths exceed
66 km.
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Table 3 : Elasticity of Tolls, Profits, and Welfare as Inputs Vary
Toll: W-NONC Toll: Õ-Nonc Toll: W-Coop Payoff
Trip Length 0.171 0.100 0.600 1.765
Network Costs 0.171 0.100 0.600 -0.215
Collection Costs 0.114 0.067 0.400 -0.159
note: the elasticity of payoffs to changes in trip length, network costs, and collection costs is the same for
both welfare and profit, and cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria
8. NON-COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY
Non-cooperative game theory is employed to analyze the strategic interactions
between two jurisdictions under various conditions and objectives. Two decisions are
considered: first, the strategic choice of revenue mechanism (tax or toll); and second, the
tactical selection of the rate of tax or toll given the strategic choices by jurisdiction J0 and
the other jurisdictions (the environment).
The application of game theory requires acceptance of certain assumptions about the
behavior of actors (in this case jurisdictions) and their level of knowledge.  First, it is
assumed that actors are instrumentally rational, that is they express preferences (which are
ordered consistently and obey the property of transitivity) and act to best satisfy those
preferences.  Second, it is assumed that there is common knowledge of rationality (CKR),
which means that each actor knows that each other actor is instrumentally rational, and that
each actor knows that each actor knows, and so on.   Third, it is assumed that there is a
consistent alignment of beliefs (CAB), such that that each actor, given the same information
and circumstances, will make the same decision - no actor should be surprised by what
another actor does.  Last, it is assumed all players know the rules of the game, including all
possible actions and the payoffs of each for every player.  These four assumptions are used
in our analysis of a highly stylized game between two jurisdictions who have clear
objectives.
The payoff to each jurisdiction depends on the policy (tax or toll), objective
(welfare or profit), and the toll-setting equilibrium (cooperative or non-cooperative) taken
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by both itself and the other jurisdiction. The source of interaction between jurisdictions
derives from residents of one jurisdiction traveling on the roads of the other.  Thus the
revenue and the pricing policy of one jurisdiction alters the demand for the roads of both
jurisdictions. The payoffs to jurisdictions are shown in Tables 4 and 5, representing
Welfare and Profit respectively.
Table 4 : Payoffs for Welfare Maximizing Jurisdictions







Õ-Non-Coop. [636,  636] [1049,  699] [1822,  577] [2226,  535]
W-Non-Coop. =
Õ- Coop.
[699, 1049] [1153, 1153]* [1901, 951] [2322,  883]
W-Coop. =
Cost Recovery
[577, 1822] [951, 1901]     [1567, 1567]     [1914, 1455]
Tax [535, 2226] [883, 2322] [1455, 1914]     [1777, 1777]
note: [payoff to JI, payoff to JJ]; *: Indicates Nash Equilibrium in One-Shot Game; Italics : Indicates Higher
Welfare Scenario Pair;      Underline Italics                 : Indicates Highest Welfare Scenario Pair with Toll Policy, Stable
under repeated game equilibrium;      Double-Underline Italics      : Indicates Highest Welfare Scenario Pair
Examining Table 4, we can find the Nash equilibrium solution to the one-shot
game, that is the solution where JI cannot improve its position given what JJ is doing, and
vice versa, for welfare maximizing jurisdictions.  The tolls from the non-cooperative local
welfare maximizing scenario produce the Nash Equilibrium.  For all JJ polices, JI
maximizes welfare by choosing this policy, similarly for JJ.   However, a number of
scenario pairs, denoted in italics have higher overall welfare, both jurisdictions together
would be better off if somehow they could choose any of those pairs.  Assuming toll
policies, welfare would be maximized by each jurisdiction choosing the lower tolls of
cooperative toll-setting, while overall, a [tax, tax] scenario pair (with no tolls) has the
highest overall welfare.
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Table 5 : Payoffs for Profit Maximizing Jurisdictions







Õ-Non-Coop. [424, 424]* [699, 350] [1246, 0]     [1521, -169]
W-Non-Coop. =
Õ- Coop.
[350, 699]     [577, 577] [951, 0] [1161, -279]
W-Coop. = Cost
Recovery
[0, 1246] [0, 951] [0, 0] [0, -459]
Tax     [-169, 1521] [-279, 1161] [-459, 0] [-561, -561]
note: *: Indicates Nash Equilibrium in One-Shot Game; Italics : Indicates Higher Profit Scenario Pair;
     Underline Italics      : Indicates Highest Stable (non-cooperative repeated game) Profit Scenario Pair;      Double-     
     Underline Italics      : Indicates Highest Profit Scenario Pair
Similarly, examining Table 5, where both jurisdictions are profit maximizing, we
find that the Nash equilibrium is to employ the tolls assuming profit-maximizing non-
cooperative toll-setting.  Again, a number of scenario pairs have higher overall payoffs.
Table 6: Payoff Accruing to Jurisdictions: JI Welfare Maximizing, JJ Profit
Maximizing







Õ-Non-Coop. [636,  424] [1049,  350] [1822,  0]     [2226,  -169]
W-Non-Coop. =
Õ- Coop.
[699, 699]* [1153, 577] [1901, 0] [2322,  -279]
W-Coop. =
Cost Recovery
[577, 1246] [951, 951] [1567, 0] [1914, -459]
Tax     [535, 1521] [883, 1161] [1455, 0] [1777, -561]
note: *: Indicates Nash Equilibrium in One-Shot Game; Italics : Indicates Higher Payoff Scenario Pair;
     Double-Underline Italics      : Indicates Highest Payoff Scenario Pair
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Combining the matrices from Table 4 and Table 5, shown in Table 6, we consider
the payoffs where one jurisdiction is welfare maximizing JI and the other JJ is profit
maximizing.  In this case, for a one-shot non-cooperative equilibrium game, JI  chooses the
welfare maximizing non-cooperative tolls while JJ chooses the profit maximizing non-
cooperative tolls.  Most of the other scenario pairs produce higher total payoffs, indicating
gains from cooperation or a repeated game.
9. INFINITELY REPEATED GAME
Tables 4, 5, and 6 represent a number of payoffs, but at their heart lie a complex
prisoner’s dilemma, with multiple cooperative and non-cooperative strategies.  The tables
show that the Nash equilibrium solution does not have the highest overall payoff. In a
repeated game, the payoff maximizing solution may also be an equilibrium when some
mechanism to enforce cooperation is in place.  Cooperation has two advantages. First
cooperation protects local citizens from the negative effects of other jurisdiction’s pricing
policies.  Second, cooperation eliminates the finance externality which reduces demand for
local roads from non-local residents and then hurts profits.  Other mixed policies
(alternating [Tax, Toll] and [Toll, Tax] for instance) may also achieve higher results,
especially since they reduce collection costs and the negative effects of a serial monopoly
relative to a single monopoly (Chamberlin 1933). Enforcement mechanisms include the
ability to “punish” and “reward” neighbors in a repeated game, a government in the case of
many players (jurisdictions), or a negotiated treaty, contract, or compact.
This dissonance between individual and collective payoffs in a one-time game may
disappear in a repeated game.  While both the one-shot and the finitely repeated prisoner’s
dilemma give unique solutions, the indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma does not
ensure a unique solution. The “Folk Theorem” demonstrates that in infinitely and
indefinitely repeated games, any of the potential payoff pairs in repeated games can be
obtained as a Nash equilibrium with a suitable choice of strategies by the players.  There
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are always multiple equilibria in an indefinitely repeated game, though some strategies have
higher collective payoffs than others.  Given various discount rates, different solutions will
result in the highest repeated game payoff.
The question is how cooperation between jurisdictions can be achieved. A
mechanism which can result in strategic cooperation without actual negotiation is the
enforcement available in repeated games.  In an indefinitely repeated game, one
jurisdiction’s behavior can be disciplined by another.  Cheating on an agreement (for
instance tolling when taxing was agreed to) by jurisdiction JI in one round (year) can be
punished in the next period by jurisdiction JJ, which would also toll, thereby hurting the
payoff to jurisdiction JI.  This section applies the mathematics underlying repeated games,
and computes the necessary discount factors for cooperation to be stable between rational
jurisdictions.
To begin we will examine the conventional two strategy one-shot game.  Consider
the representation in Table 7 (after Taylor 1987) of the payoffs for two strategies of the two
player prisoner’s dilemma game, where the traditional prisoner’s dilemma cooperate
strategy is associated with tax and the defect strategy with non-cooperative toll-setting.  (A
similar construction could be made between either of these two policies and a cooperative
toll-setting policy).  As noted above non-cooperative toll-setting is a Nash equilibrium in
this one-shot game. The letters w, x, y, and z are used to denote the payoffs in this section
as shown in the table.
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Table 7: Welfare of Boundary Crossing Trips on Infinite Road Covered by
Two Welfare-Maximizing Jurisdictions
J0 \  J1 Tax Non-Cooperative Tolls
Tax [x, x] = [1777, 1777] [z, y] = [883, 2322]
Non-Cooperative Tolls [y, z] = [2322, 883] [w, w] = [1153, 1153]
where: y > x > w > z, numeric values indicate payoff from model
Payoffs from repeated games (or a supergame) can be thought of as the summation
of a series of payoffs from one-shot games, discounted so that the present period’s game is
more valuable than the next and so on.  If we define a discount factor for jurisdiction i, ai,
(and a discount rate: 1- ai), then we can compute the supergame payoff (X) from a strategy
which results in the payoff x on every turn as X = x(ai + ai
2 + ai
3 + ...), or X = x(ai / (1- ai
)), and similarly for any other payoffs (w, y, z).  It should be noted that 1 ³ ai ³ 0, and
other values are invalid (suggesting either future payoffs are more valuable than the present
if ai > 1, or that future payoffs are negative in value if 0 > ai ).  It should also be noted that
the discount factor can vary for different jurisdictions.
Strategies in a sequence of games can be formulated which result in stable equilibria
for each player and higher payoffs.  We will consider four supergame strategies: tax on
every round (c
¥), toll on every round (t
¥), conditionally tax with initial trust (B), and
conditionally tax with initial distrust (B’). The  first conditional strategy (B), (also called tit-
for-tat  ) begins by cooperating (imposing a tax) on turn 1, and then on all subsequent turns
does what the other player did in the previous turn.  A variation on this strategy (B’) is also
tit-for-tat, but begins by defecting (imposing a toll) on turn 1, and then doing what the
other player did.
We can conclude that in the repeated game, the strategy pair of both jurisdictions




is an equilibrium.   Neither player can improve their position if the other plays t
¥.
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However, this is not necessarily the best equilibrium.  The strategy of taxing every round,
again independent of what the other players are doing (c
¥), is never an equilibrium.  If
your opponent is playing c
¥, there is always a gain possible from any other strategy.  The
conditional supergame strategies, where the policy employed by one jurisdiction depends
on what other jurisdictions did on a previous turn, are more complicated.
We can reformulate the game in terms of supergame strategies, shown in Table 8.
The three supergame strategies which are sometimes equilibria (B, B’, t
¥) can be played by
jurisdiction JI and JJ.   The cells in the table show which conditions (of Table 9) hold for
the supergame strategy to be a repeated game equilibria.  It can be shown (Taylor 1987)
that the results shown in the first column of Table 9 hold when the conditions in the second
column bear out.
Table 8: Conditions for Supergame Strategies to be Equilibria
J0 \ J1 B B’ t
¥
B (1) & (2)
for J0, J1
[1 ³ ai ³ 0.60]
(3) & rev. (2)
for J0, J1
[0.60 ³ ai ³ 0.23]
Never equilibrium
B’ (3) & rev. (2)
for J0, J1
[0.60 ³ ai ³ 0.23]
(4) & rev. (3)
for J0, J1
[0.30 ³ ai  ³ 0]
(4) & rev (3)
for JJ
[0.30 ³ aJ  ³ 0]
t
¥ Never equilibrium (4) & rev (3)
for JI
[0.30 ³ aI  ³ 0]
Always equilibrium
Note: rev. denotes reversing the ³ in the equation (i.e. making it £). Conditions are defined in Table 6.8
[] indicates results of conditions for game
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Table 9 : Conditions for Supergame Strategies, and Results from Equations
Above
Result Condition Value of RHS
(1) B is superior to t









(3) B’ is superior to t










The final column of Table 9 gives the value associated with the right hand side of
the condition in the table.  Applying those conditions to the strategy pairs of Table 8 we get
the solution to the repeated game equilibria, shown by the range of discount factors shown
in brackets in that table. We assume that if there are multiple equilibria in the game, that
jurisdictions will choose the one which results in the highest welfare to them so long as it
results in the highest welfare to other players.  Just as in the one-shot game, if there is one
stable equilibrium which does provide the highest welfare to all players, it can be
anticipated to be chosen. We see several policy pairs are valid (repeated game equilibria).
Significantly for discount factors  in the range: 1 ³ ai ³ 0.60 (or discount rates between 0%
and 40%, where typical governement interest rates are well under 10% in the United States
in the 1990s), mutual cooperation [B, B] is a stable equilibrium, and since it has the highest
payoff, we can assume that it would be the selected equilibrium.
This alternating policy pair [B’, B] or [B, B’] emerges as stable for the range of
discount factors: 0.60 ³ ai ³ 0.23 (or discount rates between 40% and 77%).  Implicitly
this assumes that toll-booths can be constructed and removed at no loss, or at least result in
no charge during the off-turn, though the extent to which this is true is empirical.  A similar
policy is for one jurisdiction to always play cooperate and the other defect, so long as
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revenues are shared equally between them.  Whether this can actually be enforced depends
on the institutional arrangements between the jurisdictions.  However, if we assume that
these jurisdictions can cooperate at that level, it is unclear why they would select the
alternating policy pair unless it had a higher payoff.
A range of discount factors (0.30 ³ ai ³ 0) (discount rates between 70% and 100%)
allows the policy pair of [B’, B’] to be stable, which in practice is the equivalent of mutual
defection [t
¥,t
¥].  Similarly [t
¥, B’] and [B’ ,t
¥] are stable when one or the other
jurisdiction has such a low discount factor (0.30 ³ ai ³ 0).  These policies are also the
equivalent of mutual defection [t
¥, t
¥].
This exercise can be undertaken for other profit and welfare maximizing policy
couplets.  The key point to take away is that cooperative equilibria are stable for a wide
variety of realistic interest rates for indefinitely and infinitely repeated games.
10. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper examined the question of what happens when jurisdictions have the
opportunity establish toll-booths at the frontier separating them.  Clearly, tolls are more
likely at frontiers than at internal locations if only because a greater percentage of the toll
falls on non-residents.  Nevertheless, for larger jurisdictions, frontier toll-booths still raise
nearly half their revenue from residents.
If welfare-maximizing jurisdictions behave non-cooperatively, they are likely to
toll, however if they can arrange to cooperate, they will employ lower tolls or agree not to
toll.  Cooperation is easier the fewer jurisdictions involved.  A border between two large
jurisdictions essentially involves traffic from only those two jurisdictions.  However, that
same border along small jurisdictions will serve traffic from many different jurisdictions.
If all jurisdictions hope to maximize profit, they will toll, even if they do cooperate.
However if they cooperate, they will charge lower tolls and even eliminate one toll-booth
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between them (so that they share revenue while lowering operating costs).  Profit
maximization is more likely under private sector management than public sector.  So if
tolling is a desired policy outcome, privatization will be more likely to achieve it than public
control.
There are several ways the analysis could be extended.  First is the inclusion of
congestion costs.  Congestion pricing is often cited as the main benefit from road pricing,
but its benefits cannot be understood with the model in the absence of delay due to excess
demand. Second, this paper has assumed that travelers are identical except in their
reservation price. Congestion pricing is most meaningful when demand is heterogeneous,
that is different travelers have different values of time and differ in their disutility from
congestion.  Third, all fixed costs were neglected.  This simplifies the analysis, particularly
under cost recovery behavior, but is not necessarily a realistic approach.
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Figure 2 : Tolls as Network Cost Changes by Scenario
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Figure 3 : Tolls as Collection Cost Changes by Scenario
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Figure 4 Tolls as Average Trip Length Changes by Scenario
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Figure 5 : Welfare and Profit as Tolls Change by Scenario


































Welfare Maximizing Solutions 
(Cooperative, NonCooperative)
Profit Maximizing Solutions 
(Cooperative, NonCooperative)
                                                
i To quantify the importance of frontiers, of 133 major countries existing prior to the fall of the Soviet
Union, there were 500 international boundaries between them, with each boundary containing multiple
crossings (source: author’s calculations).  This does not include sub-national frontiers (state, provincial,
county, or city boundaries, for instance).
ii By symmetry, the consumers’ surplus in each direction is identical, and by symmetric trip tables, half the
flow in each direction is made by residents, therefore we only need to compute the total consumers’ surplus
in one direction rather than half in both directions.
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iii The Nash equilibrium conditions state that when all jurisdictions are identical, each jurisdiction will try
to achieve the highest welfare for themselves, recognizing that other jurisdictions will do the same.
However in an indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game, strategies which enforce cooperation by
punishing “defection”  can be employed to maximize overall welfare.
iv  In an infinitely repeated games context, this is the best result that jurisdictions can attain over the
long term, and though other solutions are also equilibria, no other solution improves on this one overall
(though a single jurisdiction raising tolls - violating the equal tolls provision, may have a higher individual
welfare or profit).
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